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ESSAY
REVIEW OF CONSERVATION PAYMENT INITIATIVES IN
LATIN AMERICA: CONSERVATION CONCESSIONS,
CONSERVATION INCENTIVE AGREEMENTS AND PERMIT
RETIREMENT SCHEMES
ANDREW WOLMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the past two decades, the issue of land conservation
in Latin America has become increasingly important to environmentalists
both within and outside of the region. Latin America accounts for forty per-
cent of the world's plant and animal species' and twenty-five percent of the
world's forest cover.2 The region's forests are an indispensable means of
combating climate change, with the tree cover acting as a vast sink that
absorbs carbon from the atmosphere It is now generally accepted that the
preservation of Latin America's natural landscapes is of vital importance to
the future health of the planet.
While awareness of the environmental value of Latin American land
preservation has certainly increased in recent years, that awareness has not
necessarily translated into increased environmental preservation. On the con-
trary, the level of deforestation in the region has continued to be high as a
result of considerable economic and demographic pressures.4
* Associate, White & Case, New York; J.D., New York University School of Law 2003;
B.A., Princeton University 1999.1 UNITED NATIONS ENv'T. PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 2000, ch. 2, The
State of the Environment-Latin American and the Carribean, available at http://wwwl.
unep.org/geo-text/0087.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
OUTLOOK 2000].
2 UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 3, Fact Sheet:
Latin America and the Carribean, available at http://www.unep.org/GEO/pdfs/GEO-
3%2OFact%2OSheet%/o20Latin %2OAmer.pdf(last visited Jan. 24,2004). However, over forty
percent of the world's forest loss over the past thirty years has been in Latin America. Id.
3 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 2000, supra note 1, available at http://wwwl.unep.org/
geo-text/0083.htn
4 "A total of 5.8 million hectares a year [of Latin American forests] was lost during 1990-95,
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In confronting the seemingly unstoppable trend of deforestation, envi-
ronmental organizations have experimented with a number of market mech-
anisms to 'purchase' conservation. These range all the way from simple land
purchases to more complex mechanisms such as conservation easements and
subsidies for the development of ecologically friendly activities or eco-tour-
ism. This Article specifically looks at three of the most recent developments
that involve direct payments for the conservation of land: conservation con-
cessions, conservation incentive agreements, and permit retirements.
Conservation concessions are similar to a logging or grazing concession
in that they involve a private group paying a sum ofmoney-often the market
price-for the exclusive right to exploit public land in a particular manner for
a period of time.5 However, the concession holder does not then exploit the
land, but rather preserves it in a natural state.6 While "conservation con-
cessions" are normally purchased from a governmental entity, they can also
be purchased from current concession holders in the private sector.7
Conservation incentive agreements are contracts whereby a conservation
organization will provide funding to a private landowner-oftentimes a land
cooperative or indigenous group--in exchange for the landowner's commit-
ment not to exploit that land in a particular manner for a period of time.'
Evidently, the major difference between a conservation concession and a
conservation incentive agreement is that conservation incentive agreements
protect privately owned lands, while conservation concessions protect public
lands.
Finally, permit retirements refer to the purchase-generally by conser-
vation organizations--of permits or concessions to exploit public lands,
followed by the permanent retirement of those permits or concessions by the
government entity that issues the permits.9 A permit retirement is similar to
resulting in a 3 per cent [sic] total loss for the period." Id. For information on demographic
and economic pressures leading to deforestation, see generally, K.S. Murali & R. Hegde,
Patterns of Tropical Deforestation, 9 J. OF TROPICAL FOREST Sci. 465 (1997), available at
http://www.teriin.org/division/regdiv/for/docs/abs07.htrm
' Jared Hardner & Richard Rice, Rethinking Green Consumerism, SCI. AM., May 2002, at
89.
6Id.
71d.
81d.
9 See Mark Salvo & Andy Kerr, Permits for Cash: A Fair and Equitable Resolution to the
Public Land Range War, RANGELANDS, Feb. 2001, at 22, 22, available at http://uvalde.
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a conservation concession, except that it involves quasi-permanent land pro-
tection, a feature that necessarily implies governmental participation in the
process.1°
This Article is organized in the following manner. Part II provides a
brief overview of the traditional methods of nature conservation in Latin
America. Part Ill describes some of the innovative conservation payment
ideas that preceded the introduction of conservation concessions, conser-
vation incentive agreements, and permit retirements. Part IV summarizes the
development of the conservation concession concept, both in the United
States and Latin America. Part V analyzes the development of conservation
incentive agreements, and Part VI the development of permit retirement
projects.
II. TRADITIONAL CONSERVATION METHODS
Traditionally, Latin American public sector conservation strategies have
been based on the twofold strategy of the establishment of national parks and
general environmental regulation. " The oldest method has been the establish-
ment of national parks or protected areas.' 2 The early national parks in Latin
tamu.edu/rangel/feb0l/salvo.pdf.
'
0 Id. The actual permanency of permit retirements is debatable, at least in the United States.
According to a memorandum opinion by United States Solicitor William Meyers, "[a]
decision to cease livestock grazing is not permanent. It is subject to reconsideration,
modification and reversal in subsequent land use plan decisions ... [t]o avoid confusion, the
voluntary relinquishment ofa grazing permit is best referred to as just that-'relinquishment,'
not 'retirement."' See, e.g., Memorandum from William G. Myers III, Solicitor, United States
Dep't of the Interior, to Secretary, United States Dep't of the Interior, n.2 (Oct. 4, 2002),
available at http://www.rangebiome.org/genesis/myersmemo.html.
" Stephen Mack, Conservaci6n de Tierras Privadas: Las Servidumbres Ecol6gicas
[Conservation of Private Lands: Ecological Servitudes], in CONSERVACION DE TIERRAS
PRIVADAS EN AMUR1CA CENTRAL [CONSERVATION OF PRIVATE LANDS IN CENTRAL AMERICA]
1, 2 (Carlos M. Chacon & Rolando Castro eds., 1997), available at http://www.cedarena.org/
landtrust/publicaciones/Libro-ca.doc.
2 Id. The first national parks in Latin America date back to the early 1900s, although in some
countries-such as Guyana-the development of a national park system has only occurred
in very recent years. Some of the earliest examples of national parks are the El Chico forest
reserve (established 1898, subsequently renamed Desierto de los Leones in 1917) in Mexico,
Vicente Perez Rosales National Park in Chile (established 1926), and Pico Cristal Park in
Cuba (established 1930). See UNITEDNATIONS ENV'TPROGRAMME, CEP TECH. RPT. NO. 36,
STATUS OF PROTECTED AREA SYSTEMS IN THE WIDER CARIBBEAN REGION (1996), available
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America "were seen... as means to preserve natural areas, to develop rec-
reation and tourism areas, and to develop rural and [peripheral regions]."13
These parks were therefore generally "located in isolated inaccessible areas,
along beaches or in resort areas, and along frontiers or in newly colonized
territories."' 4 The lands within Latin American parks are often owned and
managed to different degrees by private parties. 5
A very impressive system of parks and protected areas has been created
across Latin America. The Latin American and Caribbean region currently
possess a total of two hundred and thirty million hectares (568 million acres)
ofnationally protected areas.16 This represents eleven percent of the total land
area for the region.17 The strategy of acquiring land to establish national parks
and wildlife refuges, however, has often proved expensive for governments."
Even where the land has remained in private hands, the cost of developing
and carrying out a management plan has sometimes proved prohibitive. 9 In
addition, the designation of lands as national parks or protected areas has
sometimes been unpopular due to the local population's demand for land.2"
The second main prong of Latin American conservation law has been
the imposition of environmental land use regulations by local governments.2'
at http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/techreports/tr36en/index.html.
13 KENTON R. MILLER, PEACE CORPS INFO., COLLECTION & EXCHANGE REPRINT R073,
PLANNING NATIONAL PARKS FOR ECODEVELOPMENT: METHODS AND CASES FROM LATIN
AMERICA, at ch. 2, para. 3 (1989), available at http://nmg-unixl .marasconewton.com/peace
corps/Documents/R0073/r0073e/r0073e00.htm.
14 Id.
5 The percent of protected lands owned by private parties varies considerably by country.
In Nicaragua, for example, only four out of the seventy-five protected areas are located on
public lands, while in Chile and Costa Rica most of the protected land is under state
ownership. See Nina Saalismaa, Local People and Protection: A Case Study from the
Protected Area of Miraflor in Nicaragua 1 (2000), at http://www.helsinld.fi/hum/ibero/
xaman/articulos/2000_01/saalismaa.html (citing J. Romero, Areas Protegidas y Desarrollo
Sostenible, paper presented at First Congress on the Planning and Management of Protected
Areas (Havana, Cuba, 1999)).
'6 Kari Keipi, Introduction, in FOREST RESOURCE POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 2,5 (Kari Keipi
ed., 1999) [hereinafter FOREST RESOURCE POLICY].
17 Id.
"S Jan G. Laarman, Government Policies Affecting Forests, in FOREST RESOURCE POLICY,
supra note 16, at 13, 17.
19 Id.2 oMack, supra note 11, at 8.
21See generally Lawrence J. Jensen, Environmental Regulation in Latin America:A Rapidly
862 [Vol. 28:859
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This is a more recent development, with the first comprehensive regulations
dating from the years following the Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment in 1972.22 Early examples of environmental legislation include
the 1974 Code on Renewable Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection (Colombia);23 the Law for the Prevention and Control of Environ-
mental Pollution Decree (Ecuador, 1986);24 and the Organic Law on the
Environment (Venezuela, 1976).25 Other countries have taken longer to pass
environmental protection legislation. The strategy of environmental regu-
lation, while of course appropriate to many situations, has also shown some
distinct disadvantages, including high costs of enforcement and lack of
flexibility.26 As with the establishment of protected areas, environmental
regulation is not solely capable of solving Latin America's land preservation
problems.
In more recent years, private conservation organizations have played a
greater role in preservation activities. While private conservation groups have
existed in Latin America since at least the 1960s, they did not become a
major force in Latin American land conservation issues until the 1980s and
1990s.2' These organizations included both large Western groups such as the
Changing Legal Framework, 8 NAT. RES. & ENv'T 23 (1993) (describing environmental
changes in Latin America, and noting that many Latin American countries have responded
by instituting comprehensive framework laws for environmental regulation, especially in the
years since 1988).
22 UNrrED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK- 1: GLOBAL STATE
OF THE ENVIRONMENT REPORT, ch. 3, paras. 15-20 (1997), available at http://www.rrcap.
unep.org/geol/ch/ch3_20.htm [hereinafter GEO-1]; UNITED NATIONS ENv'T PROGRAMME,
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, U.N. Doc
A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1, UN Sales No. E.73.lI.A. 14 (Stockholm 1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M.
1416.
' See Codigo Nacional de los Recursos Renovables y Proteccion al Medio Ambiente
[National Code on Renewable Natural Resources and Environmental Protection], Decree
Law No. 2,811 (1974) (Colom.), summary available at http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/tech
reports/tr36en/countries/colombia.html; see also GEO-1, supra note 22, at ch. 3, para. 15.
24 See Ley de Prevenci6n y Control de la Contaminaci6n Ambiental [Ecuadorian Act on the
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution] (1976) (Ecuador), cited at http://www.
un.org/esa/agenda2l/natlinfo/countr/ecuador/natur.htm; see also GEO-1, supra note 22, at
ch. 3, para. 17.
" See GEO-1, supra note 22, at ch. 3, para. 15.
26 See Mack, supra note 11, at 8.
2 ANTHONY BEBBINGTON ET. AL., NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STATE
IN LATIN AMERICA: RETHINKING ROLES IN SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 1
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Nature Conservancy,28 Conservation International, 29 and the World Wildlife
Fund,3" and smaller groups native to the region, such as Pro-Natura in
Mexico,3 Fundaci6n Natura in Colombia,3 2 the Centro de Derecho Ambiental
y de los Recursos Naturales ("CEDARENA") in Costa Rica,33 and the Comit6
Nacional Pro Defensa de Fauna y Flora ("CODEFF") in Chile.34
These private groups have utilized a variety of methods to conserve
lands. The major conservation method for many private organizations,
however, has been the purchase of environmentally valuable territory to
protect under the form of private conservation reserves. 3 For example, the
Nature Conservancy recently helped to purchase and set aside a portion of the
Cuatro Cirnagas (Four Marshes) in north-central Mexico, a region of spring-
fed desert pools and wetlands.36 Conservation International recently acquired
a large tract of the Pantanal, a vast Everglades-like wetland that straddles the
border between Brazil, Paraguay, and Bolivia.3" In Costa Rica, the Montever-
de Conservation League has purchased 54,340 acres of forest lands, "inclu-
ding the Children's Eternal Rain Forest, which was bought with contributions
from European school children and is now the largest private preserve in
Costa Rica. '
38
(1993); JOHN CLARK, DEMOCRATIZING DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY
ORGANIZATIONS (1991); Carrie A. Meyer, Environmental NGOs in Ecuador: A n Economic
Analysis of Institutional Change, 27 J. DEV. AREAS 191, 191-92 (1993).2 8See The Nature Conservancy homepage, at http://nature.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
29 See Conservation International homepage, at http://www.conservation.org/xp/CIWEB/
home (last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
30 See World Wildlife Fund homepage, at http://www.panda.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
" See Pro-Natura homepage, at http://www.pronatura.org.br/en/home (last visited Sept. 9,
2003).
32 See Fundaci6n Natura Columbia homepage, at http://www.natura.org.co/ (last visited Sept.
10, 2003).
3 See CEDARENA homepage, at http://www.cedarena.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
See CODEFF homepage, athttp://www.sociedadcivil.cl/codeff/inicial.htm(last visited Oct.
6, 2003).
" See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE SOLUTION FROM THE FUTURE OF LIFE, at ch. 7 (2002); see
also ENVTL. LAW INST., LEGAL TOOLS AND INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE LANDS CONSERVATION
IN LATIN AMERICA: BUILDING MODELS FOR SUCCESS 15 (2003), available at http://www.
elistore.org/reportsdetail.asp?ID=10914 [hereinafter LEGAL TOOLS AND INCENTIVES]. See
id. at 16-21 for a thorough examination of the private reserve system in Latin America.
36 LEGAL TOOLS AND INCENTIVES, supra note 37, at 16-21.
37/d.
38 Agi Kiss, Making Biodiversity Conservation a Land Use Priority, in GETTING
[Vol. 28:859864
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While these purchases have been valuable, the use of land purchases as
a conservation technique has limited potential. The conservation of large
tracts of land typically requires government intervention because of high
costs, the need for social legitimacy, and the need to employ the state's en-
forcement capacity. 9 Also, most conservation groups do not possess the
resources to effectively manage very large areas of land.' ° This has led many
conservation policy experts to explore alternative ways of funding land
preservation.
The following section describes in greater depth two of the innovative
ways in which conservation groups used payments as incentives for conser-
vation without resorting to direct land purchases.
In. PAYMENTS FOR CONSERVATION
A. Debt-for-Nature Swaps
One of the first truly innovative approaches to conservation in Latin
America was the debt-for-nature swap, which first appeared in the late
1980s.4 ' Debt-for-nature swaps are mechanisms for financing conservation
projects that essentially involve payments-through the purchase of
sovereign debt-to countries in exchange for the provision of conservation
services.42 They are worthy of discussion in this context because they
presented a number of issues that were of importance in the development of
future conservation strategies, including those analyzed in this Article. In
BIODIVERSITY PROJECTS TO WORK: TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE CONSERVATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 7 (T. McShane & M. Wells eds., in press), available at http://epp.gsu.edu/
pferraro/special/AgiBookChapter2002.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2004).39 See LEGAL TOOLS AND INCENTIVES, supra note 35, at 6.
40 Local political opposition has also been an occasional problem in some large scale land
purchases for preservation purposes. See, e.g., Jonathan Franklin & John Vidal, Baron
Lands, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 23, 2002, available at http://society.guardian.co.uld
societyguardian/story/0,7843,637467,00.html (describing opposition to Patagonia Clothing
founder Douglas Tompkins' land purchases in Chile).
41 See J.P. Resor, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A Decade for Experience and New Directions for
the Future, 48 UNASYLVA 15, 15 (1997), available at http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/
8708/en (stating that in 1987 the Bolivian government and Conservation International signed
the first debt-for-nature swap agreement).
42 Paul J. Ferraro & R. David Simpson, Cost-Effective Conservation: A Review of What
Works to Preserve Biodiversity, RESOURCES, Spring 2001, at 17, 20.
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fact, the developers ofconservation concessions have made a conscious effort
to learn from some of the problems that arose in early debt-for-nature swaps.
Debt-for-nature swaps can be divided into two categories: private swaps
and public swaps.43 Private swaps normally involve a number of steps. They
are initiated when "an international [conservation] organization . .
purchase[s] part of[a developing country's] international debt at a discounted
price in the secondary market." The conservation organization will then
agree to cancel this debt in exchange for assurance from the developing
country's government to conserve more biodiversity, increase funding for
conservation projects, or set aside particular lands for preservation.45
Public debt-for-nature swaps are similar in structure to private swaps,
except for the fact that creditor governments agree to cancel debt directly in
return for environmental commitments, thus cutting out the role of interna-
tional conservation organizations in buying debt on the secondary markets."
Debt-for-nature swaps ideally present benefits for both developing countries
and environmental organizations. The developing country is able to "reduce[]
its external debt servicing burdens while supporting [domestic] public interest
programs.,
47
While debt-for-nature swaps have generally been a successful financing
mechanism, it soon became clear that they possessed a number of potential
drawbacks and limitations. For one thing, they are time consuming and
expensive to arrange, and are therefore generally only viable on a fairly large
scale.48 They involve potential monitoring and enforcement problems for
43 See U.N. ECON. COMM'N FOR LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN, DEBT FOR NATURE: A
SWAP WHOSE TIME HAS GONE? (2001), available at http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/
Mexico/7/LCMEXL497/1497.pdf.
"Id. The most active groups in this respect have been Conservation International, the World
Wildlife Fund and the Nature Conservancy. Other private groups that have initiated swaps
include the Smithsonian Institution, the Rainforest Alliance, and the Missouri Botanical
Gardens. Id. at tbl. 2.
4- See Ferraro & Simpson, supra note 42, at 20.
' See Amanda Lewis, Note, The Evolving Process of Swapping Debt for Nature, 10 COLO.
J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 431, 441-43 (1999).
4' Ruth Ann Flynn, The Impact of US. Tax Laws on the Future of Debt-For-Nature Swaps,
7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 319, 324 (1993).
41 See World Wildlife Fund Center for Conservation Finance, Commercial Debt-for-Nature
Swaps Summary Table (Dec. 17, 2003), at http://secure.worldwildlife.org/conservation
finance/pubs/commercialswaps sunilary.pdf(listing the purchase price for debt-for-nature
transactions, which is usually at least several hundred thousand dollars).
866 [Vol. 28:859
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Western conservation organizations that are not easily able to confront sover-
eign governments if they feel that the country's performance has been
lacking.49 For developing countries, on the other hand, there has historically
been a fear of loss of sovereignty stemming from debt-for-nature swaps,50 and
some debt-for-nature swaps have provoked the opposition of indigenous
groups who fear that they will lose rights to their lands.5
In developing more recent conservation techniques, such as conservation
easements and conservation concessions, environmentalists have tried to
learn from the problems of the early debt-for-nature swaps. One aspect of this
is that increased attention has been paid to interactions with local inhabitants
and indigenous groups. For example, in Conservation International's
Guyanese conservation concession, a Social Impact Assessment was drawn
up prior to the agreement to ensure that indigenous peoples were not adverse-
ly affected and the three nearest indigenous communities all participated in
the concession's negotiation process.52 In the Ejido Cebadillas conservation
incentive agreement, the agreement was negotiated directly with a local land
cooperative, without any government involvement, and included economic
development incentives."
B. Conservation Easements
Conservation easements are one of the most commonly used land pro-
tection methods in the United States.54 Over the past decade, conservation
"9 See Michael S. Sher, Can Lawyers Save the Rainforest? Enforcing the Second Generation
of Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 151 (1993).
" See, e.g., Priya Alagiri, Comment, Give Us Sovereignty or Give Us Debt: Debtor
Countries'Perspective on Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 485 (1992).
"' This conflict has been evident as of the very first debt-for-nature swap, in Bolivia's Beni
Reserve, when local Native Americans accused Conservation International of divesting them
of their property rights. One of the main bones of contention was that the swap restricted the
right of Native Americans to use trees for fuel. See Lewis, supra note 46, at 436.
2 See Press Release, Conservation Int'l, Guyana Establishes its First Conservation
Concession (July 18, 2002), available at http://www.conservation.org/xp/news/press_
releases/2002/071802.xml [hereinafter Guyana Establishes].
" Endangered Mexican Parrots Safe from Logging, ENV'T NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 15, 2000,
available at http://forests.org/archive/samerica/endmxpre.htm. The Mexican organizations
were Pro-Natura, Naturalia, Monterrey Tec, the Sierra Madre Alliance and Wildlife
Preservation Trust International. Id.
' "Recent studies show that over 2.6 million acres of land are currently protected by
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easements have been implemented in several Latin American nations.55 In the
United States, a conservation easement is commonly defined as a:
nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing
limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which
include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space
values of real property, assuring its availability for agri-
cultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting
natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water
quality, or preserving historical, architectural, archaeological,
or cultural aspects of the real property.56
A conservation easement is a deed restriction on all or part of a parcel of
land, where specified development or land use rights are voluntarily given up
by the landowner." The recipient of these rights is generally either a govern-
mental body or a non-profit entity. 58 All other traits of ownership, including
conservation easements, up from two hundred and ninety thousand acres in 1988." Jeffrey
Tapick, Note, Threats to the Continued Existence of Conservation Easements, 27 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 257, 259 (2002) (citing Katharine Q. Seelye, More Families Adopting Lasting
Limits to Preserve Land, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at B 1; Julie Ann Gustanski, Protecting
the Land Conservation Easements, Voluntary Actions, and Private Lands, in PROTECTING
THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 14 (Julie Ann
Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000)).
The first conservation easement was put into place in Latin America in 1992, to protect a
tract of land from future development in San Ram6n de Tres Rios, Costa Rica. However,
conservation easements did not appear in other Latin American countries until 1998-2001.
See Carlos M. Chac6n & Andrea Meza, Servidumbres Ecol6gicas para la Protecci6n
Ambiental en Tierras Privadas Costarricenses [Ecological Servitudes for Environmental
Protection in Private Lands in Costa Rica], AMBIENTICO, no. 90 (Mar. 2001), available at
http://www.una.ac.cr/ambi/Ambien-Tico/90/cchacon.htrm.
56 UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1) (1981).
"Id. Therefore, while ownership of the tract does not change hands, conservation easements
do involve the transfer of property rights to the purchasing party, as opposed to simply
contract rights. Id. A "conservation easement [can] prohibit all ground disturbing activity on
a piece of wild land or prohibit only activities that will interfere with particular things ...."
Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and
Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV.
1077, 1080 (1996).
" Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA.
L. REV. 739, 742 (2002).
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alienability, remain in the hands of the landowner. 9 Conservation easements
generally, but not invariably, last into perpetuity, binding both current and
future owners.6W
Conservation easements contain a number of attractive features for en-
vironmental policy makers both in Latin America and elsewhere. They are
voluntary agreements that do not require actions by the state.6" They are also
very flexible: conservation easements can be defined to protect a particular
element of the natural landscape while still allowing for some development.
62
Conservation easements can be used to effectively preserve parcels of land
that would be considered too small to be managed by the state in a natural
park or protected area.63 Finally, conservation easements tend to be cheaper
than full land acquisitions, a feature that is evidently of great importance to
governments and conservation organizations with very limited resources.' 4
Conservation easements have been an extremely welcome addition to
the repertoire of conservation techniques in Latin America. As with debt-for-
nature swaps, however, conservation easements have their limitations, which
have prompted the development of other conservation methods, such as those
discussed in the remainder of this paper. Most importantly, the civil law
system in Latin America generally allows for conservation easements to be
granted only in favor of a tract of land that would benefit from the easement
(for example, a dominant tenement).65 This obviously limits the possible
scope of conservation easements absent legal reforms, which are occurring
9 Tapick, supra note 54, at 261.
o Cheever, supra note 57, at 1083 (noting that "[m]ost state conservation easement statutes
provide that conservation easements are to be unlimited in duration unless otherwise stated
in the instrument itself').
61 Mack, supra note 11, at 10.
62 Id. at 10-11; LEGAL TooLs AND INCENTIVES, supra note 35, at 15. There are few
limitations on the type of conservation purpose a conservation easement must promote. See
supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing the recognized purposes of conservation
easements in several states in the United States).
63 Mack, supra note 11, at 11.
6Id. at 10.
65 Caroline Amillien et al., Mecanismos Legales Para la Conservaci6n de Tierras Privadas
en Anrica Central, in CONSERVACIN DE TiERRAS PRIVADAS EN AMtRICA CENTRAL 25, 31
(Carlos M. Chac6n & Rolando Castro eds., 1998), available at http://www.cedarena.org/
landtrust/publicaciones/Libro-ca.doc ("[E]n la mayoria de paises, incluidos los de
Centroamrica, las servidumbres solo pueden establecerse en beneficio de otra propiedad.
... ") ["In the majority of countries, including those in Central America, servitudes can only
be established to the benefit of another property...."J.
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in some countries.66 Conservation incentive agreements, on the other hand,
do not involve property rights, and therefore can be negotiated between a
landowner and any other entity.67 While conservation incentive agreements
would lack the permanence of a conservation easement, they can fulfill much
the same purpose otherwise while avoiding legal pitfalls.
C. Other Instruments
This Article has described in some depth the issues relating to debt-for-
nature swaps and conservation easements, because these techniques have had
particular influence on the development of conservation concessions, conser-
vation incentive agreements, and permit retirements. There are other methods
that conservation groups are using, however, to pay for land conservation."
These include subsidizing ecologically friendly development, such as eco-
tourism, and paying for environmental services that generate land preser-
vation "as a side benefit"--one example would be carbon sequestration.69
Clearly the diversity of conservation strategies that have arisen over the past
fifteen years is a beneficial development. There can be no one-size-fits-all
approach to conservation, given the different demands of both land-owners
and conservation organizations. The remainder of this Article describes the
development of three of the newest payment incentives to be added to the
arsenal of conservation techniques: conservation concessions, conservation
incentive agreements, and permit retirements.
"The Mexican states ofNueva Leon, Quintana Roo, and Veracruz have approved laws that
authorize conservation easements and allow them to be held by third parties. See LEGAL
TooLs AND INCENTIVES, supra note 35, at 22. In addition, the Argentinian province of
Chubut passed a state law for protected areas in 2000 expressly authorizing the creation of
conservation easements in favor of the provincial government. Id. at 43. "Proposed laws
authorizing in-gross conservation easements have.., been introduced in [other] countries
such as Chile, Costa Rica, and Ecuador." Id. at 22.
67 As noted previously, conservation easements convey rights in property, and therefore a
dominant and sevient tenement is required under Latin American property laws.
68 See generally N. LANDELL-MILLS & INA T. PORRAS, SILVER BULLETS OR FOOLS' GOLD?:
A GLOBAL REVIEW OF MARKETS FOR FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES AND THEIR IMPACTS
ON THE POOR (Int'l Inst. for Env't & Dev. 2002) (reviewing 287 cases and asking six market-
based questions of each to examine whether markets for forest environmental services solve
problems or if they cause other, more harmful problems).
69 See Paul J. Ferraro & Agnes Kiss, Direct Payments to Conserve Biodiversity, 298 SCIENCE
1718, 1719 (2002).
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IV. CONSERVATION CONCESSIONS
According to Conservation International, a conservation concession is
a "free-market mechanism that allows conservationists to compete directly
with extractive industries for the rights to natural resources. Conservation
concessions directly compensate resource owners for any revenue or employ-
ment that might have occurred as a result of exploiting a given area."7 This
section first describes the background of conservation concessions in the
context of the United States, and then explains how conservation concessions
are being implemented in Latin America.
A. Conservation Concessions in the United States.
One of the pioneering groups that has used conservation concessions as
a means to preserve public lands that had previously been used for grazing
purposes is a New Mexico-based organization called the Forest Guardians.7
Forest Guardians obtained their first conservation concession in 1995, when
they won an uncontested bid for grazing rights to 1,438 acres on the Rio
Embudo, halfway between Santa Fe and Taos, in New Mexico.72
Since that time, Forest Guardians has attempted to win a number of
other conservation concessions. While it has had many successes, the organi-
zation has also encountered a large amount of political and legal opposition
in its efforts to buy up grazing concessions.73 One recent example of a
successful conservation concession was the October 2002 acquisition by
Forest Guardians of a 644 acre grazing lease along the Rio Puerco river in
New Mexico.74 The land had little native vegetation left on it due to years of
70 Press Release, Conservation Int'l, Building Global Alliances for Biodiversity Protection-
Backgrounder (Dec. 9, 2001), available at http://www.conservation.org/xp/news/press_
releases/2001/120901a.xmil.
71 See Forest Guardians homepage, at http://www.fguardians.org/ (last visited Mar. 23,2004).
7 Ollie Reed Jr., Environment Group Secures Grazing Lease, ALBUQUERQUE TRIBUNE, Oct.
5,2002, available athttp://www.abqtrib.com/archives/news02/100502-newsgrazing.shtml.
73 See, e.g., Jeffries v. Hassell, 3 P.3d 1071 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 1999) (vindicating the Forest
Guardians' right to bid on grazing leases owned by the State of Arizona despite the fact that
they did not intend to graze on those lands; previously, the Arizona Land Department had
rejected such bids).
7" Reed, supra note 72, at para. 1.
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grazing, but Forest Guardians attempted to replant native plants on the tract.75
According to John Homing, executive director of the Forest Guardians, "the
group bid $2,600 per year for five years-seven times what the previous
leaseholder paid. '76 New Mexico law allots most grazing lease money
directly to state public schools, adding another socially beneficial component
to the concession purchase. 7
In the United States, advocates of conservation concessions have en-
countered significant barriers to their efforts to implement conservation
concession schemes on federal lands. 78 For example, USFS, which manages
191 million acres of federal lands, only designates logging companies as
"responsible bidders" for its logging concession auctions. 79 The Bureau of
Land Management ("BLM") gives preference to landowners "engaged in the
livestock business," but allows bids from other groups and individuals as
long as they own cattle.8" Permit holders on BLM lands have the ability to
authorize nonuse of grazing lands by permit holders in special circumstances,
but only for up to three years.8 Unauthorized nonuse results in termination
of the permit. 2
It is also worth mentioning in passing the purchase of government-
issued pollution emission permits by environmental organizations. This
practice can be seen as analogous to the purchase of conservation conces-
7"Id. at para. 19-20.
71 Id. at para. 4.
n Id.
71 See Mark Muro, Let Ecologist Buy Federal Timber, N.Y. TIMES COMPANY, Mar. 29, 1997,
at Al 9, available at www.forests.archive/america/ecobuyti.com.
79 Id. This policy was unsuccessfully challenged in a joint petition by the Southwest Center
for Biological Diversity, the Northwest Ecosystem Alliance of Washington state and the
Oregon Natural Resources Council to allow conservation concessions. Jim Lyons, USDA
undersecretary for resources and the environment at the time, "pronounced the plan [to
legalize conservation concessions] 'interesting and novel' but not 'feasible."' Keeping the
Forests Shut, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, May 15, 1997, available at http://www.azstarnet.com/
clips/keepshut.htm. In the United States, federal agencies are not generally authorized to
grant conservation easements either. See Memorandum from Douglas R. Cox, Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to the General Counsel, Dep't
of Conm (Jan. 19, 1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/conserv_19.htm.
"O Steven C. Forrest, Creating New Opportunities for Ecosystem Restoration on Public
Lands: An Analysis of the Potential for Bureau ofLand Management Lands, 23 PUB. LAND
& REs. L. REV. 21, 31 (2002).
11 . at 43.
82 Id.
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sions, but with a goal of pollution reduction as opposed to land preser-
vation.83
The United States manages a number of pollution trading programs,
where permits to emit a certain amount of pollutant for a particular time
period can be bought and sold on the open market.8 Many environmental law
societies and other environmental organizations have bought small numbers
of emissions permits with no intention of using them.85 This practice will
probably become more common as tradeable permit schemes spread around
the world-especially with reference to greenhouse gasses-and into differ-
ent sectors, such as water pollution. One danger, however, is that govern-
ments will simply increase the number of emissions permits they issue for a
particular time period in order to achieve the desired pollution levels, while
compensating for the purchase of permits by non-polluters.
B. Conservation Concessions in Latin America
Over the last few years, conservation concessions have also emerged at
the international level, particularly in Latin America.8 6 Forest concessions are
particularly common in Suriname, Guyana, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicara-
gua, but have also been established in a number of other Latin American
countries.8" The non-profit group Conservation International has been at the
See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
8' See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 67 (2001), available at http://yosemitel.epa.gov/ee/
epa/eernuisf/.
8 For example, at the EPA's 2001 sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide allowance auction, the
Acid Rain Retirement Fund purchased eleven credits for $1,980; the Maryland
Environmental Law Society bought seven credits for $1,275; and the Bates College
Planeteers bought one credit for $191. See Brian Wagner, Environmentalists Steamed over
Pollution Credits, N.J. ExPRESS-TIMES, June 24, 2001.
8 In addition to the Latin American schemes that are described in this Article, conservation
concessions are currently being developed in Indonesia and Papua, New Guinea. ANDREAS
MERKL ETAL., CONSERVATION & COMMUNITY INVESTMENT FORUM, A ROLE FOR EFFECTIWE,
EFFICIENT, AND EQUITABLE CONSERVATION CONCESSIONS IN CONSERVING NATURAL
RESOURCES IN INDONESIA 2-5 (2003), available at http://www.conservationfinance.org/WPC/
WPCdocuments/Apps 09_MerklClaussen-v2.pdf.
87 See John A. Gray, Forest Concessions: Experience and Lesson from Countries Around the
World, Presented to the LUFRA International Symposium on Integrated Management of
Neotropical Rain Forests by Industries and Communities, at 3 (Dec. 4-7, 2000), available
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forefront ofthis development." International conservation concessions have,
to date, been on a much larger scale than the domestic examples, and have
been the result of difficult negotiations with host governments.8 9 Never-
theless, conservation concessions hold great promise as a way for developing
countries to protect their land while ensuring a flow of income.9" As it is a
very recent concept, conservation concessions have not been addressed in
national legislation as of yet, with the notable exception of Peru's Forestry
and Wildlife Law of 2001,91 which explicitly and effectively authorizes
conservation concessions, and to a lesser extent the laws of Chile, Brazil, and
Bolivia, which address conservation concessions in a less comprehensive
manner.
92
Conservation concession payments in Latin America have been
structured on a continual basis during the time period for which the con-
cession is valid, unlike the up-front payments that generally accompany a
at http://www.fs.fed.us/global/aboutus/policy/tt/reports/johngray2.doc.
"' Conservation International has been supported in its conservation payment schemes in
Latin America in large part by a December 2001 grant from the Gordon and Betty Moore
Foundation, totaling up to $261.2 million over a ten year span. This grant is part of "the
single largest set ofphilantropic investments made in tropical biodiversity conservation." See
Gordon & Betty Moore Found., Conservation International (Oct. 2001), at http://www.
moore.org/grantees/grant~summariescontent.asp?Grantee=ci (last visited Mar. 23, 2004).
Other organizations that are experimenting with conservation concessions include WWF and
Birdlife International. MERKL ET AL., supra note 86, at 2.
9 See Eric Johnson, Environmentalists Compete for Logging Concessions, 9 PANAMA NEWS
10 (May 25-June 7, 2003), available at http://www.panamanews.com/pn/v_09/issue_10/
business 02.html.
90 See MERKL ET AL., supra note 86, at 6 ("Conservation concessions enable host countries
to capitalize on their ample supply of biodiversity-rich habitats and stimulate economic
development by mimicking the payment structure of other business transactions and offer
immediate, transparent protection for resources in question.").
9" Ley Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre [Forestry and Wildlife Law], Numero 27308 (2001)
(Peru), available atwww.elaw.org/resources/printable.asp?id=556?; see also LEGALTOOLS
AND INCENTIVES, supra note 35, at 26, 172, 196 n.17, 205 n. 17 (citing Decreto Supreme 014-
2001-AG (2001) (Peru); Resoluti6n Ministerial 0566-2001-AG (2001) (Peru) (adding
complementary dispositions)).
9 Ley Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre [Forestry and Wildlife Law], Numero 27308, Articula
10(2)(b) (2001) (Peru). While Chile, Brazil, and Bolivia all "have laws authorizing
conservation concessions on public lands," these laws have not been effectively
implemented. LEGAL TOOLS AND INCENTIVES, supra note 35, at 26. More comprehensive
conservation concession legislation is currently being considered in Chile and Bolivia. Id.
at 9.
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conservation easement that is not donated.9" Unlike conservation easements
or protected areas that have been established through debt-for-nature swaps
or other projects, the restriction and ecological benefit in a conservation
concession are generally not perpetual.94 This can be considered a disadvan-
tage, but can also present opportunities. According to one analyst:
[The conservation concession] can bridge a gap to a skeptical
government that may be saying, "We don't really want to
make this into a permanent park, because we just don't know
what we may want in the future; we're just not ready to do
that." We can say, "If you're ready to let these areas out in a
timber concession, why can't we just compete for those
timber concessions? Why do you have to be a logging
company to apply to hold a timber concession? Why not
allow us to hold a conservation concession, where we'll pay
the same amount of royalty but we won't log the land? Why
shouldn't any logical land management system allow for
that? '
The periodic nature of conservation concession payments could also
improve the prospects for compliance with the concession by the public land
owner-for example, the avoidance of logging on the lands. A possible
response to concession violations by the land owner is for the concession
holder to simply stop paying. This can be contrasted with the much less
satisfactory enforcement mechanisms for violations of conservation ease-
ments. Often, the only recourse available is through the courts; this can be
unsatisfactory from the conservationist's point of view for a number of
reasons.
96
93Richard Rice, Conservation Concessions: Concept Description, in UNDERSTANDING AND
CAPTURING THE MULTIPLE VALUES OF TROPICAL FORESTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON VALUATION AND INNOVATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS IN
SUPPORT OF CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF TROPICALFOREST 83, 83-
84 (P.A. Verweij ed., 2001), available athttp://www.tropenbos.nl/flles/Verweij/ O16Rice.pdf
("A conservation concession typically involves periodic payments in return for the
conservation of a specified area.").
" James Leavitt & Dana Sevoy, Face-to-Face with Ian Bowles, REP. ON CONSERVATION
INNOVATION (The Internet & Conservation Project, Harvard Univ.), Winter 2003, at 8,
available at http://harvardforest.fas.harvard.edu/research/pci/RCIWinter_2003.pdf.fc.
95 Id. at 4.
9 See LEGAL TOOLS AND INCENTIVES, supra note 35, at 6.
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One final advantage with conservation concessions is that they can be
a relatively simple contracting mechanism, as they need not be any more
complex than a standard logging concession or grazing lease.97
One danger with conservation concessions and permit retirement
schemes is that a government may react to the purchase of a forest concession
by a conservation group by deciding to simply reduce its own conservation
projects elsewhere. In doing so, the government achieves the original balance
of development and land preservation that had been planned prior to the
conservation concession. While this is a somewhat cynical view of political
decision-making, in some circumstances this type of behavior could present
a danger. It is possible to obtain promises not to engage in such behavior-
for example, in the Noel Kempff Project in Bolivia," logging rights were
bought "only on the condition that companies could not reinvest funds into
unsustainable logging elsewhere." 99 However, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to monitor or enforce such a clause given the economic con-
straints on NGO environmental activists. On the other hand, environmentally
valuable land, at least in theory, are not exactly interchangeable in the way
that emissions permits are, which should make compensatory development
on other lands less likely.
The first conservation concessions in Latin America were granted during
the early nineties in Chile, where three foundations took advantage of a law
which provided that the Ministry of Bienes Nacionales could grant conser-
vation concessions to NGOs under very favorable terms-no fees were
required for the concession, and the duration of the concession could be
indefinite.1" However, these concessions were short-lived, as none of the
foundations were able to maintain their concessions, thus leaving control of
the areas to revert back to the State.1"' Since that time, some small conces-
9 For example, the Los Amigos conservation concession in Peru took only three months to
negotiate from start to finish. See Richard Rice, Presentation at the Annual Meetings of the
Society for Conservation Biology, Conservation Concessions: Our Experience to Date (July
15, 2002), available at http://epp.gsu.edu/pferraro/special/RicePresentation.pdf.
9 See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
9 Ted Gullison et al., Logging Off. Mechanisms to Stop or Prevent Industrial Logging in
Forests offHigh Conservation Value, UNIONOF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 46 (2001), available
at http://www.ucsusa.org/publication.cfin?publicationlD=69.
"oo See LEGAL TOOLS AND INCENTIVES, supra note 35, at 26, 196 n. 15 (citing Article 570 et
seq., Decreto Ley N* 1,939 (1977), modified by art. 100, number 3 of Ley N*, 19,606
(1999)).
'
0 Id. at 26.
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sions have been granted in Chile, mainly for eco-tourism purposes.° 2 More
recently, major conservation concessions have been negotiated with govern-
ments in Peru and Guyana.13
The first Peruvian conservation concession was granted July of 2001 to
the conservation group Asociaci6n para la Conservaci6n de la Cuenca
Amaz6nica ("ACCA"). ° The renewable forty-year concession involves an
area of one hundred and thirty thousand hectacres in the Los Amigos River
watershed where ACCA was in the process of establishing an ecological
research station.'0 5 Rich in plant and bird life, "[t]his land forms part of an
ecological corridor that links Manu and Bahuaja-Sonene national parks in
Peru."' 6 This concession was finalized shortly after the passage of a new
Peruvian Forestry Law which explicitly legitimized conservation conces-
sions.'07
A year later, in July 2002, Conservation International established the
Upper Essequibo Conservation Concession, an agreement to manage two
hundred thousand acres in southern Guyana for conservation purposes.108
Conservation International paid the Guyana Forestry Commission an appli-
cation fee of twenty thousand dollars and an initial rate of fifteen cents an
acre annually for the concession.1' 9 This rate is comparable to an active
timber concession."' The project was concluded after stakeholder consul-
tations had been conducted at a local and national level. Also included in the
project was a side agreement with three local indigenous communities-the
Apoteri, Rewa and Crashwater-to establish a Voluntary Community
Investment Fund to facilitate community development programs."'
1 2I d .
103 See Rice, supra note 93, at 84.
' Id.; Hardner & Rice, supra note 5, at 95. The Peruvian government and its people
supported the two conservation groups in their pursuit to create the Los Amigos conservation
concession through the "legal advice from the Peruvian Environmental Law Society (SPDA),
assistance from independent environmental consultant Enrique Toledo, and the enthusiastic
support of Peru's Minister of Agriculture, Carlos Amat y Leon." Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
"7 See sources cited supra note 91.
'o' See Guyana Establishes, supra note 52.
"o Kiss, supra note 38, at 13.
"o Guyana Establishes, supra note 52.
111 Id.
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Conservation International is also in the process of negotiating a
conservation concession of seventy-five thousand hectares with two local
communities in the Maya Biosphere Reserve in Guatemala, an area of
pristine forest that also contains important Mayan ruins." 2 The concessions
would pay the salaries of conservation managers, invest in eco-tourism
projects and expand services such as education and health care in exchange
for logging restrictions."3
V. CONSERVATION INCENTIVE AGREEMENTS
While the concept of conservation concessions initially developed with
regards to concessions to log on public lands, there is no reason why similarly
styled agreements cannot be undertaken between two private actors regarding
exploitation rights on entirely private lands. This logical extension to conser-
vation concessions is in fact taking place throughout Latin America. These
agreements are sometimes called conservation incentive agreements. Conser-
vation incentive agreements are similar to conservation easements in many
ways, with the main differences being that conservation incentive agreements
involve the transfer of contract rights as opposed to property rights. This
means that conservation incentive agreements are temporary and can be
conducted between any two or more parties without the requirements of a
dominant and servient tenement. As with conservation concessions, payments
for conservation incentive agreements are generally made on a periodic
basis.'
As with conservation concessions, conservation incentive agreements
also exist in the United States.
The Prairie Wetlands Chapter [of the Kansas Wetlands and
Riparian Areas Alliance], for example, recently received
funding from the Playa Lakes Joint Venture to support the
112 See Hardner & Rice, supra note 5, at 95; Rice, supra note 93, at 86.
"3 See Rice, supra note 93, at 86; see also Hardner & Rice, supra note 5, at 95.
"4 Richard Rice et. al, Conservation Incentive Agreements: An Approach to Linking
Conservation and Economic Development on Indigenous Lands in Ecuador, Presented to the
International Conference on Rural Livelihoods, Forests, and Biodiversity, at 5 (May 19-23,
2003) (on file with the author) ("[Conservation incentive agreements] offer a natural context
within which to implement cost-effect monitoring, since payments are made on an annual
basis and are made contingent upon a set of carefully defined performance metrics.").
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acquisition of conservation leases on playas in the western
third of the State. This project will pay landowners not to
farm in playas and to establish permanent buffers around
these seasonal wetlands.' 15
One example of a conservation incentive agreement in Latin America is
the agreement between the Ejido Cebadillas and six conservation groups (five
of which were Mexico-based," 6 with the sixth being the Tucson-based
Wildlands Project) to protect a forty thousand acre land parcel in the Sierra
Madre Occidental mountains in northern Chihuahua, Mexico." 7 The parcel
includes the nesting sites of half the world's western thick-billed parrots."1 8
There was no governmental involvement in this project. Rather, the agree-
ment was drawn up directly between the conservation organizations and the
seventy-four members of the ejido, or land cooperative,"19 designating "ejido
members 50 percent of the net value of the uncut timber within the protected
area over the next fifteen years. The Wildlands Project will fund a forestry
study for the remainder of the cooperative's land, which will result in a
sustainable logging plan."' 20 If the sustainable management plan is certified
by the International Forest Stewardship Council, timber will command
superior prices than before the plan's certification.12 ' In addition, the conser-
vation organizations will also encourage eco-tourism development through
the construction of three cabins for birdwatchers and other visitors interested
in the natural beauty of the area.
2 2
While the funding for the project will come largely from the Wildlands
Project, the Mexican NGOs "will take a lead role in community development
projects" and "assist in implementing and monitoring the agreement....""'
"
5 Tim Christian, Kan. Wetlands & Riparian Lands Alliance, A New Image for Kansas,
available at http://library.fws.gov/Birdscapes/sprsumO2/Howto.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2004).
"
6 The Mexican organizations were Pro-Natura, Naturalia, Monterrey Tec, the Sierra Madre
Alliance and Wildlife Preservation Trust International. Endangered Mexican Parrots Safe
from Logging, supra note 53, at para. 2.
11 id.
usId. at para. 1.
"
9 Id. at para. 4.2 0 Id. at para. 9.
121 Id. at para. 16.
'2 Endangered Mexican Parrots Safe from Logging, supra note 52, at para. 11.
'LId. at para. 16.
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This agreement typifies the new generation of conservation activism that
combines the best attributes of measures such as conservation concessions,
eco-labeling, and eco-tourism into an integrated agreement that encourages
environmental preservation while providing for the developmental needs of
the local population.
Another conservation incentive agreement that has recently been
implemented is a project involving the Worldwide Fund for Nature and the
Mexican government to purchase logging rights from local inhabitants in
areas of Monarch butterfly habitat. 124 The Worldwide Fund for Nature has
used a five million dollar grant from the Packard Foundation to set up the
Monarch Butterfly Conservation Fund, which now purchases logging permits
from permit holders within the Monarch Butterfly Biosphere Reserve for
eighteen dollars per cubic meter of timber not harvested, and provides
payments to landowners to conserve their lands (totaling "[twelve dollars] per
hectare for those without logging permits and US [eight dollars] per hectare
with logging permits"). "'25 The project will also support "sustainable eco-
nomic projects in the buffer zone of the reserve and to fund law enforcement
activities" when the project is fully funded.2 6
Several other conservation incentive agreements have been either imple-
mented in recent years or are currently in the negotiations stage. In Kenya, the
Wildlife Foundation has purchased conservation leases on private lands to
secure a wildlife corridor for four dollars per acre for each year. 27 Conser-
vation International has completed a conservation incentive agreement with
a copper company to protect a rare forest type in Peru, and is negotiating
other possibilities in Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Sierra Leone and else-
where with a number of partners, including the Nature Conservancy, Birdlife
International, and Deutsche Gesellschaft fir Technische Zusammenarbeit
("GTZ"), the German government-owned international development cor-
poration.2
" See World Wildlife Fund (Mexico), Conservation Efforts for the Monarch Butterfly, at
http://www.wwforg.mx/monarch-conservation.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Ferraro & Kiss, supra note 69, at 1719.
128 See Richard Rice et al., Conservation Incentive Agreements: An Approach to Linking
Conservation and Economic Development on Indigenous Lands in Ecuador, Presented to the
International Conference on Rural Livelihoods, Forests, and Biodiversity, at 2-3 (May 19-23,
2003) (on file with author).
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One variety on the conservation incentive theme is the negotiation of
agreements between conservation organizations and logging companies to
undertake environmentally sustainable logging on particular concessions.
This has the benefit of still providing forjobs and some economic benefit in
the affected area, while maintaining the environment in an acceptable state.
An example of this type of project that took place on a small scale is Sabah,
Malaysia, in 1992, with an American utility company paying a Malaysian
logging company to implement reduced-impact logging guidelines.'29
VI. PERMIT RETIREMENT
Within the United States, and more recently in Latin America, there
have been a number of instances where logging or grazing permits have been
purchased by conservation groups and then permanently retired by the state
authority that issued the permits. This is essentially analogous to a conser-
vation concession, with the difference being that the logging or grazing on the
relevant public land will be stopped permanently, and not just for a period of
years. Of course, it is within the power of the government to reissue a logging
or grazing concession on a particular parcel of land, despite the fact that the
concession has been formally "retired." 30 However, there presumably would
be considerable political opposition to acting in such a fashion, and research
has not uncovered any instances of permits being issued after retirement.3
One of the first permit retirement schemes was created in 1996, in
Nevada's Great Basin National Park. 32 At the behest of Nevada's congres-
sional delegation, "Congress amended the law [establishing] Great Basin
National Park [in order] to allow... grazing" concession holders to volun-
tarily donate their grazing permits "back to the Park Service."' 33 In 1999,
three permit holders donated their grazing permits back to the park service in
return for payments of approximately $2.20 per acre from a variety of
conservation organizations.
3 4
'29 See Michelle A. Pinard & Francis E. Putz, Retaining Forest Biomass by Reducing
Logging Damage, 28 BIOTROPICA 278 (1996).
3o See Memorandum from William G. Myers II, supra note 10.
"' Based on author's research as of April 12, 2004.
'
32 See Salvo & Kerr, supra note 9, at 22-23.
'
33 Id. at 22.
134 Id. at 22-23.
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Another interesting permit retirement scheme was implemented in 1998-
99 at the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in Utah. 35 Here, the
Grand Canyon Trust negotiated deals to pay eleven grazing permit holders to
fully or partially end their concessions.'36 The permit holders relinquished
their permits to the Bureau of Land Management, which then administratively
retired the permits through an amendment in the Escalante Management
Framework Plan.33 Grazing concessions were in this way removed from
nearly one hundred thousand acres of ecologically valuable lands. 31
Permit retirements can be seen as analytically similar to the establish-
ment of a protected area on public lands. In fact, this was explicitly the result
when "the Northwest Ecosystem Alliance ("NWEA") raised $16.5 million to
buy the timber rights on the 11,363 [hectare] Loomis State Forest in
northeastern Washington [in 1999]."3 In exchange for a payment of $16.5
million-the market value of the timber in the forest-the Washington
Department of Natural Resources transferred the land from trust status to a
permanent Natural Resource Conservation Area.'"0
While the preceding permit retirement schemes have been implemented
on an ad hoc basis, two bills have recently been introduced which would
provide for voluntary permit retirement for ranchers on federal lands. 4 If
passed, the federal bill would appropriate one hundred million dollars to pay
willing federal grazing permit holders to permanently retire their grazing
permits.'42 While the bills have garnered some support among individual
ranchers, there has been opposition from ranching organizations and certain
Western politicians. 43
"' Id. at 23.
136 Id.
137 Id.
131 See Salvo & Kerr, supra note 9, at 23.
" Gullison et al., supra note 100, at 44. A $3.4 million contribution from Microsoft co-
founder Paul Allen saved the deal at the last minute. See Northwest Ecosystem Alliance,
Projects: Loomis Forest Fund: Victory for the Loomis Forest, at http://www.ecosysten.org/
projectsloomis.htnil (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
140 Id.
141 See Arizona Voluntary Grazing Permit Buyout Act of 2003, H.R. 3337, 108th Cong. (lst
sess. 2003); Voluntary Grazing Permit Buyout Act of 2003, H.R. 3324, 108th Cong. (1st
sess. 2003). Both bills were introduced by Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT) and
Representative Raul Grijalva (D-AZ). The only difference between the bills is scope: the
Arizona bill would only apply in that state, while the other would apply in all states.
142 See H.R. 3324.
"" See, e.g., N.S. Nokkentred, Ranchers Worry Proposed Bills Could End Grazing, DAILY
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The first example of a permit retirement scheme to be implemented in
Latin America was the 1996 Noel Kempff Project, where logging rights for
2.47 million acres in Bolivia were purchased from a private timber company
for $9.6 million in a collaborative project by the Fundaci6n Amigos de la
Naturaleza, The Nature Conservancy, the Bolivian government and three
American utility companies.'" Once the logging rights had been purchased
by the conservation groups, the Bolivian government then added those areas
to an adjacent national park so as to permanently preserve the land. 45 An
additional $1.5 million was provided to the Bolivian government in the form
of a trust fund for the administration of the park.'1
6
The Noel Kempff concession purchase was part of a thirty year Climate
Action Project, whose goal was to gain seven to ten million metric tons of
carbon benefits-forty-nine percent of which were to go to the Bolivian
government and the remainder to the American utilities. 47 As another part
of the agreement, the private timber company that sold its concessions signed
a contract agreeing to adopt sustainable management practices on its remain-
ing concessions and to avoid using money from the concession it had sold to
acquire logging concessions in different areas. 4 '
A year later, Conservation Intemational completed a similar transaction
that added one hundred and twelve thousand acres to Bolivia's Madidi
National Park.'49 This transaction involved the purchase of a logging conces-
sion from a logging company (Fatima, Ltd.) immediately prior to the planned
commencement of logging. 5 ° The purchase price for the concession was one
HERALD (Provo, UT), Nov. 29, 2003, at Al; Letter from Rep. Scott McInnis, to
Congressional Colleagues, End All Grazing on Public Lands?--"Voluntary" Buyouts are
First Step by Radical Environmental Groups Supporting Effort (Sept. 25, 2003), available
at http://www.libertymatters.org/newsservice/2003/faxback/10-1-03_2569_Grazing.htn.
,"Gu~lison et al., supra note 100, at 46.
'
45 Id. at 46.
1'4 Id. at 46.
147 Id.
148 Jonathan Rotter & Kyle Danish, Forest Carbon and the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism, 98 J. OF FORESTRY 38, 46 (2000), available at http://www.vnf.com/
content/Articles/Articles/Forestcarbon.htm.
'
49Hardner & Rice, supra note 5, at 93.
'oPress Release, Conservation International, Rapid Response Rescues Valuable Andean
Rain Forest (Sept. 30, 1999), available at http://www.conservation.org/xp/news/press_
releases/1999/093099.xml.
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hundred thousand dollars.'51 After the concession was purchased by Conser-
vation International, it was then permanently retired by the Bolivian govern-
ment, and the land added to the adjacent national park.'52
As the preceding descriptions show, permit retirement schemes differ
from conservation concession in that they will almost always require explicit
reforms in concessions policy at either the administrative or political level.
They will involve the permanent loss of a future income stream for govern-
ments and an economic development option for local communities. There-
fore, permit retirement will generally require more in depth negotiations with
conservation-minded government officials, perhaps accompanied by the
provision of compensation for the State, as in the Noel Kempffproject. These
factors would make the cost of a permit retirement scheme generally greater
for a conservation organization than the costs of implementing conservation
concessions or conservation incentive agreements. On the other hand, the
potential payoff for the conservation organization would also be greater, as
the land in question will receive permanent protection.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over the past fifteen years, there has been a growing recognition of the
need for more effective land preservation in Latin America. With this recog-
nition has come the development of a range of new conservation techniques.
These include conservation concessions, conservation incentive agreements,
and permit retirements-three recent variations on the basic theme of
payment for conservation. These conservation mechanisms can provide an
effective market incentive for land preservation. While there can be no single
conservation technique that presents a silver bullet to the environmental
problems facing Latin America, the mechanisms discussed in this paper
represents relatively straightforward and interesting advances to preserve
ecologically important lands-both publicly and privately owned-that are
currently being exploited or threatened with exploitation.
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